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Nailing Down Occurrence Triggers for Property
Damage in the Wake of Redevelopment-Why a
Distinction Should Be Made Between First and Third
Party Policies
1. INTRODUCTION: THE AFTERMATH OF DISASTER-LouISIANA'S
CURRENT REBUILDING CRISIS
Devastation, destruction, and a new way of life were
introduced to the residents of the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005
with the arrival of Hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately for Louisiana,
the road to recovery after the devastation of Katrina was tragically
interrupted almost one month later in the form of another category
three hurricane named Rita. The amount of damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina alone is staggering, with an impacted area of
90,000 square miles-an area larger than Great Britain. ' As of
March 8, 2006, over $36.9 billion had already been appropriated
for response and recovery efforts in the Gulf Coast, with even
more funds being requested.2
Louisiana has focused its use of such resources on rebuilding
the state in an attempt to bring back the many residents and
businesses that had to take to higher ground.3 Such a rebuilding
effort has been dubbed by some as "the biggest redevelopment
effort in history."4 However, with such a mass effort of rebuilding,
the concern turns to the scores of contractors who are flocking to
the Gulf Coast in an attempt to get a bite at the FEMA apple.
5
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1. Fiscal 2006 Supplemental Appropriations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security), 2006 WLNR
3897874.
2. Id.
3. Leslie Eaton, Hurricane Aid Finally Flowing to Homeowners, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 12267261.
4. Id. (quoting Walter J. Leger Jr., chairman of the housing task force for
the Louisiana Recovery Authority).
5. Greg Thomas, Taking the Con Out of Contractor, TIMES PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Aug. 6, 2006, at Money 1, available at 2006 WLNR 13577426.
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The number of citations issued to contractors for "shoddy
work" and failure to obtain requisite state licenses has increased
from 237 in the year leading up to Katrina to over 460 since. 6 in
addition, consumer complaints against contractors and fines levied
against them have also dramatically increased.7 It seems inevitable
that these rebuilding efforts will be plagued by a multitude of
construction defect claims, some arising at the outset of
construction while others may go unnoticed for years. Thus, it
becomes necessary to explore Louisiana's remedy for such defects
in the context of insurance coverage and determine whether this
remedy is up for the long and arduous task it will be confronted
with for years to come. The time is now to provide illumination on
an area of insurance law in Louisiana that heretofore has been
masked in a gray fog.
This Comment examines the jurisprudential response to
construction defects resulting in property damage in the context of
insurance coverage. The question that must be clearly answered
up front with property damage claims is whether there was an
"occurrence" 8 that "triggered ' ' coverage for the claimed "property
damage."' 10 What is typically at issue is whether insurance
coverage is triggered when the damage is discovered or when
6. Id.
7. Id. There were over $500,000 in fines against unlicensed builders, up
from between $100,000 to $200,000 in years prior to Katrina. Id.
8. "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."
Sample Commercial General Liability Policy, ISO Properties, Inc. (2003),
reprinted in WILLIAM SHELBY MCKENZIE & ALSTON JOHNSON, INSURANCE
LAW & PRACTICE app. C, in 15 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE, 1124 (3d ed.
2006) [hereinafter Sample Policy].
9. "Trigger" is a term used to describe what must happen, according to the
terms of an insurance policy, for the potential of coverage to arise. Montrose
Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 880 n.2 (Cal. 1995).
10. "Property damage" is generally defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible
property [wherein] such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of
physical injury that caused it." MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8. See also
id. § 183, at 494 ("The requirement of bodily injury or property damage during
the policy period as the trigger of coverage is often referred to as 'occurrence'
basis coverage.").
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damage results from exposure to this "shoddy work," which may
occur years prior to its discovery."
Courts have utilized different trigger theories in an attempt to
interpret insurance policy language to determine whether damage
occurred at the exposure to a harmful condition, such as the first
time it rained on a leaky roof, or whether damage occurred when
the resultant rotten framing was discovered by the property owner.
The problem with the use of such theories, as Louisiana
jurisprudence demonstrates, is the lack of consistency regarding
when and why one particular theory is used over the other. Thus,
the determination of which insurer must provide coverage for
potentially millions of dollars worth of post-Katrina rebuilding
efforts is at the mercy of a court simply employing one theory over
the other. Rather than bearing the resultant risk and uncertainty, it
is likely that insurers will pass this uncertainty on to insureds in the
form of increased premiums.
It must be mentioned at the outset, however, that the
employment of any trigger theory to determine when the "property
damage" occurred is only the beginning of the analysis. Although
beyond the scope of this Comment, an in-depth analysis must also
be undertaken to determine whether there are applicable exclusions
in the policy that ultimately exclude coverage.' 2 This Comment
11. MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 183, at 497 ("With construction
defects, the real issue usually is not whether there has been an 'occurrence,' but
whether there has been property damage during the policy period and, if so,
whether any exclusion is applicable. If the roof leaks or the wall collapses, the
resulting property damage during the policy period triggers coverage under an
'occurrence' basis policy, even if the sole cause is improper construction and the
only damage is to the work performed by the contractor. On the other hand, the
mere existence of a construction defect does not trigger coverage under an
'occurrence' basis policy because coverage is triggered only if the defect causes
property damage during the policy term.").
12. See id. ("Whether there is coverage for property damage resulting from
the insured's work or products requires additional analysis into whether one of
the property damage exclusions is applicable. In the Commercial General
Liability form, property damage that occurs while the work is in progress may
be excluded under Subsection (5) or (6) of Exclusion (j), now known as the
'damage to property' exclusion. Property damage that occurs after the work is
complete (as defined in the Products-Completed Operations Hazard) may be
excluded by Exclusion (1), the 'damage to work' exclusion. If the damage is to
'your product,' as defined in the policy, the 'damage to products' exclusion,
2008]
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focuses solely on when property damage is deemed to have
occurred according to common law trigger theories by attempting
to interpret policy language. And, although inspired in part by the
potential property damages resulting from hurricane rebuilding
efforts, the forthcoming analysis of the proper employment of
trigger theories is equally relevant in any context concerning other
types of damage, whether property or personal injury.
This Comment explores the trigger theories that have
developed in Louisiana and contrasts them with those of other
jurisdictions. The outcome of this comparison is the author's
recommendation that one theory does not fit all insurance policies,
but instead different trigger theories should be utilized depending
on the type of insurance. For first party insurance coverage,' 3 the
most equitable and economically viable theory is based on when
the damage is discovered or manifested. In contrast, for third party
insurance coverage, 14 the coverage trigger should depend on when
the actual injury took place, or in the alternative, if damage is
progressive,' then coverage should be triggered in a continuous
manner from its inception to discovery.
II. BACKGROUND To TRIGGER THEORIES AND LouIsIANA'S
APPLICATION OF THEM
In order to properly understand the development of the
manifestation and exposure theories in Louisiana, one must first be
Exclusion (k), may be applicable. If the work fails to perform properly, then
Exclusion (m) for 'impaired property' may be applicable. Exclusion (n), the
'sistership' exclusion, may prevent coverage for losses resulting from the recall
of products or work. The effect of these property damage exclusions should be
carefully analyzed for any claim resulting from construction defects. Also, there
may be contractual provisions that affect recovery of damages for defective
work.").
13. First party insurance provides coverage for damage sustained directly by
the insured, such as a standard homeowner's life, disability, health, fire, theft,
and casualty policy. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886.
14. A third party liability policy provides coverage for the insured's liability
to a third party, such as a comprehensive general liability policy, a director's and
officer's liability policy, or an errors and omissions policy. Id.
15. Id. at 882 n.6.
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aware of the different trigger theories that have emerged in other
jurisdictions. Part A will provide a brief explanation of the four
most common theories. Thereafter, Parts B and C will demonstrate
how the manifestation and exposure theories, respectively, were
developed in Louisiana. Part D will conclude with an examination
of the current status of Louisiana law regarding such theories.
A. Introduction to Trigger Theories
When confronting the issue of when insurance coverage should
be triggered, the courts have not been without guidance. In fact,
numerous theories have surfaced to help the court answer this
question. The most common theories include: (1) the
manifestation theory; (2) the exposure theory; (3) the injury-in-fact
theory; and (4) the continuous injury theory.' 6
The manifestation theory provides that insurance coverage is
triggered when the injury or damage is discovered or becomes
apparent during a policy period.' 7 The policy in effect when this
discovery is made is responsible for providing coverage.' 8 As a
result, under this theory, even if the damage was caused by a
delictual act that took place under a prior policy, the policy in
effect at the time the damage is discovered is nevertheless
responsible for coverage.
At the other end of the spectrum, the exposure theory provides
that the policy in effect when the property was exposed to the harm
must provide coverage. 19 This theory assumes that damage occurs
simultaneously with exposure.20 Therefore, even if the damage is
not discovered until years later when a different policy is in place,
the policy in effect when the property is damaged is responsible for
coverage.
The other two theories, the injury-in-fact theory and the
continuous injury theory, fill the gap between the manifestation
and exposure theories. For instance, the injury-in-fact theory
16. Gregory A. Goodman, Insurance Triggers as Judicial Gatekeepers in
Toxic Mold Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REv. 241, 260 (2004).
17. Id. at 264.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 263.
20. Id.
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provides that the policy in effect when the damage actually
occurred is responsible for coverage, regardless of when the
exposure or manifestation occurred. 21 This theory, however,
requires a difficult factual finding as to when the injury, in reality,
occurred. Consequently, technical or scientific evidence is usually
22required. On the other hand, the continuous injury trigger
encompasses both the manifestation and exposure theories by
providing that all policies in effect either at the time of exposure,
during any later periods of continuing exposure, or at the time of
manifestation are responsible to provide coverage. 23 Under this
theory, if multiple policies are implicated, each policy is allocated
a portion of the loss.
24
B. Louisiana's Development of the Manifestation Theory
In Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distributing Co.,25 the
Louisiana Supreme Court first recognized the substantial change in
policy language under an occurrence-based policy as opposed to
earlier accident-based policies.26 The court found that the policy in
question did not provide coverage since the occurrence-based
policy limited coverage to property damage occurring during the
policy period.27 Therefore, it excluded damage that occurred after
the policy period even though the damage resulted from a delictual
act committed during the policy period.28 In doing so, the court
reasoned that such exclusion was not against public policy since an
21. Id. at 265.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 267.
24. Id. at 268.
25. 292 So. 2d 190 (La. 1974).
26. MCKENZE & JOHNsON, supra note 8, § 183, at 496 ("Oceanonics
involved the 1966 policy form in which the definition of 'occurrence' required
bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. The 1973 and 1986
CGL policies require bodily injury or property damage within the policy period
in provisions separate from the definition of 'occurrence.' With this
modification, the definition of 'occurrence' is an 'accident' (including exposure
to the same conditions) .... [B]ut 'occurrence' basis policies clearly require that
the bodily injury or property damage resulting from such an accident occur
during the policy period.").
27. Oceanonics, 292 So. 2d at 191-92.
28. Id.
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insured could secure coverage for claims arising from prior
delictual acts by _purchasing completed operations and products
liability coverage.
Although the court did not refer to the manifestation theory in
its analysis, the fifth circuit in Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc.
characterized the court's reasoning as in line with the
manifestation theory.30 In this case, the fifth circuit determined
whether a developer's comprehensive general liability policy
provided coverage for the developer's liability as a result of
excessive settlement of numerous homes the developer built.
3 1
The court expressly adopted the manifestation theory over the
exposure theory and found that the excessive settlement did not
become damage until the homeowners discovered it.32 The court
reasoned that the policy requires an occurrence to "result" in
damage, which did not occur until the damage manifested.33
Numerous cases have similarly held that the manifestation
theory should be utilized to determine trigger issues; 34 however,
29. Id.
30. 653 So. 2d 1215, 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995) ("Under [the
manifestation] theory, property damage would be considered to have occurred
when it became manifest, regardless of when the act from which it resulted
occurred. That is the theory employed in Oceanonics....").
31. Id. at 1219-20.
32. Id. at 1226.
33. Id.
34. See Audubon Trace Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Brignac-Derbes, Inc., 924 So.
2d 1131 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2006); Rando v. Top Notch Props., L.L.C., 879 So.
2d 821, 833 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2004) (finding that the "clear weight of authority
in more recent cases" followed the manifestation theory in construction defect
cases, but noting that "a clear signal from the Supreme Court on this issue would
surely do much to eliminate expensive future litigation"); Oxner v.
Montgomery, 794 So. 2d 86, 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e find that the
policy is triggered when the damage manifests itself, rather than when the
negligent act which causes it occurs."); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Valentine, 665 So. 2d 43, 47 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1995) (holding that the policy in
effect during the installation of an air conditioning system was not liable for
coverage for a fire that occurred after the policy expired, even though the fire
was caused by the defective installation); Alberti v. Welco Mfg. of Tex., 560 So.
2d 964, 965 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) ("[E]ven if a chemical reaction occurred
immediately after the placement of the sheetrock mud, it is only when this
reaction affected the walls that damage envisioned in the policy occurred.");
Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stuckey, 486 So. 2d 352, 359 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2008]
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while doing so, some courts have provided further justifications for
this theory. For instance, in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. C.E. Albert
Construction Co., the court reasoned that to adopt the exposure
theory would arguably require an insurer to "remain a guarantor of
its insured's actions forever." 35  Thus, the court found that an
electrical subcontractor's insurer did not provide coverage for fire
damage because its policy was not in effect when the defective
wire failed.36
Also, in James Pest Control, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.,
the court adopted the manifestation theory, reasoning that its
application "eliminates the difficult factual issue of determining
when a hidden property damage actually occurs." 37 Therefore, the
court found the comprehensive general liability policy of a pest
control contractor was not triggered until the termite infestation
was discovered by the homeowners. 38
Furthermore, the court in New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v.
Travelers Property Casualty Co. applied the manifestation theory
over the exposure theory in a construction defect claim resulting in
mold damage.39  In doing so, the court reasoned that the
manifestation theory is appropriate because it incorporates the loss
in progress rule, which provides that an insured cannot insure
against a known loss. Thus, the policy in effect at the time of
1986) (refusing to extend insurance coverage when language limits coverage to
damage occurring during its term).
35. 661 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
36. Id.
37. 765 So. 2d 485, 491 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
38. Id.
39. 2002 WL 32121257, at *2 (E.D. La. 2002), rev'don other grounds, 363
F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at *3 n.2 ("The loss-in-progress rule and the manifestation trigger
protect an insured's access to insurance. Even if damage manifests in a
building, subsequent insurers would be willing to issue policies because they
could rely on the loss-in-progress rule to preclude coverage for progressive
property damage."). But see Estate of Patout v. City of New Iberia, 849 So. 2d
535, 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002) ("We have found no Louisiana cases that have
adopted the 'known loss' doctrine. We decline to venture into unchartered
waters. As a result, the trial court properly denied application of the 'known
loss' doctrine.").
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manifestation is liable for the entire loss, even if damage
progresses after the policy expires.4'
C. Louisiana's Development of the Exposure Theory
The court in Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., in choosing to
extend Oceanonics to stand for the manifestation theory, expressly
rejected the exposure theory as employed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Davis v. Poelman.4 2  In Davis, the court
determined when coverage was triggered for a plane that had been
damaged from exposure to the elements due to the breach of an
agreement to store the plane in a hangar.43 The court rejected the
argument that there was no coverage since the olicy had expired
prior to Davis becoming aware of the damage. Instead, it found
that the occurrence that triggered coverage was the violation of the
agreement to store the plane, since this was the cause of the
plaintiff's loss. 4 5 Therefore, because the policy was in effect at the
46time of the breach, coverage was required. Thus, as the Korossy
court found, without using the exposure theory by name, the Davis
court seemed to be applying the exposure theory.
47
Unlike the Korossy court's rejection of the exposure theory,
many courts have either refused to apply the manifestation theory
over the exposure theory as a matter of law or simply found the
exposure theory to be the proper theory to trigger coverage.48 For
41. New Orleans Assets, 2002 WL 32121257 at *2.
42. Korossy v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 653 So. 2d 1215, 1226 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1995) (citing Davis v. Poelman, 319 So. 2d 351, 354 (La. 1975)).
43. Davis, 319 So. 2d at 354.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Korossy, 653 So. 2d at 1226.
48. See Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1076-79 (La. 1992)
(adopting the exposure theory in deciding an insurance coverage dispute in the
context of personal injuries resulting from asbestos exposure). The Cole court
gave numerous policy reasons to support its adoption of the exposure theory:
First, applying the exposure theory was consistent with a literal reading of the
policy language because medical evidence indicates that injury occurs shortly
after the inhalation of asbestos fibers. Id. Second, the exposure theory would
maximize coverage to the plaintiff while at the same time spread losses back
over numerous years and likely numerous insurers. Id. at 1077. And third, the
2008] 613
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instance, in Orleans Parish School Board v. Scheyd, Inc., the court
found that a plumbing subcontractor's comprehensive general
liability policy did not unambiguously exclude coverage so as to
preclude the insurer's duty to defend.49 In Scheyd, the school
board became aware of plumbing problems four years after the
construction of their new building and approximately five years
after the plumbing subcontractor's comprehensive/commercial
general liability (CGL) policy expired.50
The Scheyd court refused to follow the manifestation theory as
a matter of law, which would have denied coverage on summary
judgment since the damage was discovered years after the policy
expired. 5' Instead, the court reasoned that although the policy
language requires property damage to occur during the policy
period, the language does not require this damage to become
noticeable during this period.52 The court refused to make the
"quantum leap" and apply the manifestation theory as a matter of
law and instead suggested that the manifestation theory may be a
rule better suited for situations where there is no evidence of when
the damage actually occurs.53
In addition, in Grefer v. Travelers Insurance Co., the court
rejected the reasoning in Korossy and applied the exposure theory
over the manifestation theory in a property damage claim resulting
from contamination to a lessor's property.54 The court found
coverage was triggered when radioactive scales were dispersed on
exposure theory upholds the contracting parties' intent because they would
expect coverage to parallel liability. Id.
49. 673 So. 2d 274, 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 276.
51. Id. at 277.
52. Id. at 278.
53. Id. at 277-78.
54. 919 So. 2d 758, 766 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005). See also Herzog
Contracting Corp. v. Oliver, 918 So. 2d 516, 522 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005) ("In
order for there to be coverage under these policies, the property damage must
have occurred during the policy period. The property damage was the
contamination . . . to the property . . . ."), writ denied, 926 So. 2d 542 (La.
2006); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2003) (finding exposure theory applicable to long-term environmental
damage).
614 [Vol. 68
COMMENTS
the property causing contamination, not when the land owner was
subsequently informed of the contamination years later.55  The
court reasoned that the policy language limiting coverage to
property damage occurring during the policy period
unambiguously provided coverage when the exposure occurred.
56
D. So Where Does This Leave Us in Louisiana?
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana attempted to answer that very question in looking to
Louisiana law in a duty to defend case.57 The court in Fontenot v.
One Beacon America Insurance Co. surveyed Louisiana cases
applying the two trigger theories, ultimately concluding that the
insurer's "reliance on cases applying the manifestation rule is
misplaced., 5 8 In so concluding, the court found that Louisiana
jurisprudence is far from uniform on this issue and could not say
with certainty that coverage was excluded.59 The court found the
language in Rando ("a clear signal from the Supreme Court on this
issue would surely do much to eliminate expensive future
litigation") 60 as well as the reasoning in Scheyd ("we cannot make
the 'quantum leap' and say that the manifestation rule is applicable
as a matter of law") 6 1 to be a clear indication that Louisiana
jurisprudence is unsettled on whether to apply the manifestation or
exposure theory to determine the trigger for coverage in
construction defect cases.
62
55. Grefer, 919 So. 2d at 766.
56. Id. Gray's CGL Policy stated that "[t]his insurance applies only to
'bodily injury' and 'property damage' which occurs during the policy period."
Id. at 765. The excess policy defined "occurrence" as "a continued or repeated
exposure to conditions occurring during the Policy Period and which results in.
damage to property during the Policy Period... ." Id. at 766.
57. 2005 WL 1788251 (W.D. La. 2005).
58. Id. at *7-8.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Rando v. Top Notch Props., L.L.C., 879 So. 2d 821, 833
(La. App. 4th Cir. 2004)).
61. Id. (quoting Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Scheyd, Inc., 673 So. 2d 274,
278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996)).
62. Id. at *6-7.
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Therefore, the answer to that question is unresolved and will be
another litigated issue in the upcoming storm of construction
defect claims arising from post-hurricane rebuilding efforts.
However, the real question is not which theory should we
categorically adopt in this context, but rather are we even on the
right track?
Instead of trying to fit all insurance policies into the
manifestation or exposure boxes, there should be a preliminary
distinction as to the type of policy we are dealing with. To date,
not one Louisiana case has recognized the significance of the
differing liabilities and coverage concerns resulting from a
distinction between first party or third party policies when
determining whether coverage has been triggered. The source of
the frustration and confusion the courts are facing in trying to
apply these theories may be alleviated by an initial determination
of the type of coverage purchased-first party or third party.
III. WHY LOUISIANA SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIRST PARTY
AND THIRD PARTY POLICIES IN RESOLVING COVERAGE TRIGGER
ISSUES
Part A commences the analysis by introducing the distinctions
between the risks and liabilities for first party policies versus third
party policies. Based in part on those distinctions, Part B
recommends the manifestation theory for first party policies,
whereas Part C posits the inappropriateness of the manifestation
theory for third party policies. The analysis will then, in Part D,
recommend an injury-in-fact theory for third party policies with
one exception, in Part E, for progressive property damage.
A. The Distinction between First Party and Third Party Policies
In order to properly analyze coverage trigger issues, it is
necessary to first distinguish between first party insurance policies
and third party liability policies.63 Cases which fail to do so while
attempting to determine whether coverage has been triggered
generally have "muddied the waters" or "shed more darkness than
63. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 886
(Cal. 1995).
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light on the matter."64 The primary reasons for such a distinction
at the outset are due to the differing nature of risks insured and the
different causation analyses that must be undertaken, depending on
the type of policy.
65
A first party insurance policy covers loss or damage that is
sustained directly by the insured.66 Examples of first party policies
include homeowner's, life, disability, health, fire, theft, and
casualty insurance. 67 First party property policies are contractual
agreements whereby the insurer indemnifies the insured in the
event the property suffers a covered loss.68 Therefore, coverage is
typically determined by reference to causation resulting from
certain covered "perils."
69
Third party insurance policies, on the other hand, provide
coverage for the insured's liability to a third party.70 Examples of
third party policies include CGL policies, directors and officers'
liability policies, or errors and omissions policies.7' Such policies
typically require the insurer to pay judgments that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of damage they
caused.72 Thus, coverage issues in third party liability policies
must be resolved by reference to "traditional tort concepts of fault,
64. Id. at 887.
65. Id. at 886.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 180, at 964-65
("These types of coverage are usually found lumped together in a so-called
homeowners or 'package' policy, which is simply a composite of fire, theft,
windstorm, and other coverages written together for marketing purposes.").
68. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886 (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989)).
69. Id. "The term 'perils' in traditional property insurance parlance refers to
fortuitous, active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and explosion, which
brings about the loss." Garvey, 775 P.2d at 710 (quoting Bragg, Concurrent
Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20
FORUM 385, 386-87 (1985)), quoted in Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886.
70. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886.
71. Id. See also MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at § 180, at 482
("Under the standard policy form, the CGL policy protects against the premises,
operations, products, completed operations, and independent contractors
hazards, but coverage for a specific hazard may be excluded by endorsement.
Likewise, additional coverages may be provided by endorsement.").
72. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886.
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proximate cause and duty."73  Furthermore, by insuring for
personal liability and providing coverage for the insured's potential
negligence, "the insurer agrees to cover the insured for a broader
spectrum of risks."
74
Another reason for a distinction between first party and third
party policies is that parties will likely have different expectations
depending on the type of coverage. 75 An insured under a first
party policy typically purchases coverage sufficient to cover his
entire potential loss. 7? For example, a property owner who
purchases fire insurance will likely elect coverage which will cover
the full value of the property in the event a fire destroys the
property.77 Therefore, the first party insured has no incentive to
look to more than one policy if a fire does take place. 78 With third
party policies, in contrast, an insured is only making an educated
guess regarding its potential liability to third parties; thus, such a
guess may fall far short of the actual exposure, differing
substantially from first party coverage expectations. 79
Given the different liabilities, causation analysis, expectations,
and policy language involved between first party and third party
insurance policies, it logically follows that the two policies'
coverage triggers should be analyzed separately as well.
B. Why the Manifestation Theory Works with First Party Policies
"[T]he clear weight of authority in more recent cases considers
defects in construction that result in damage subsequent to
completion to be accidents and occurrences when they manifest
themselves." 80  This observation is a proper way to analyze
coverage triggers, however, only when dealing with first party
insurance policies. This distinction should be made because when
73. Id. (quoting Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 886-87.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Rando v. Top Notch Props., L.L.C., 879 So. 2d 821, 833 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 2004).
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dealing with first party insureds, the damage sustained is incurred
directly by the holder of the policy (the payor of the premiums) as
opposed to a third party.
The language of a typical homeowner's policy by itself
provides a strong justification for why the manifestation theory
should be used to determine when coverage is triggered. A
homeowner's policy provides the insured with coverage for
property damage in the event the property suffers a covered loss.
8 1
Whether a loss is covered or not depends on the relationship of
certain enumerated perils82 versus other exclusions83 in the
policy. 84  Therefore, because this policy protects the insured
directly from the damage he incurs, whether a peril has occurred
should be determined from the viewpoint of this insured. Thus,
until the damage manifests itself, the loss is still a contingency and
the insured has not suffered a loss.85  Once the damage is
manifested, however, the risk is no longer contingent; rather, an
event has now occurred that triggers coverage, unless such event is
excluded under the particular policy.86  Manifestation, however,
must not only include that point in time when the property owner
discovered damage, but also that point in time when appreciable
81. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886 (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989)).
82. Examples of such perils include: fire or lightning, windstorm or hail,
explosion, riot or civil commotion, aircraft, vehicles, smoke, vandalism or
malicious mischief, theft, falling objects, weight of ice, snow, or sleet,
accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam, sudden and accidental
tearing apart, cracking, burning or bulging, freezing, sudden and accidental
damage from artificially generated electrical current, and volcanic eruption.
Sample Homeowners 2-Broad Form, reprinted in MCKENZiE & JOHNSON,
supra note 8, at app. D, at 1134-36.
83. Examples of exclusion include: loss or damage caused by ordinance or
law; earth movement such as earthquakes, landsides, or sinkholes; water damage
caused by flood or sewage back up; power failure; neglect; war; nuclear hazard;
intentional loss; governmental action. Id. app. D, at 1136-37. See also id. §
324, at 981-83.
84. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886.
85. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Super. Ct., 798 P.2d 1230, 1246-47
(Cal. 1990).
86. Id.
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damage has occurred such that a reasonable insured would be
aware of the damage.
87
Application of the manifestation theory in the first party policy
context also complies with the loss in progress rule. Once the
insured discovers damage, the loss becomes known. Therefore,
since an insured cannot insure against a known loss, the
manifestation theory triggers coverage simultaneously with a loss
becoming known. Thus, the manifestation theory allows
subsequent insurers to rely on the loss in progress rule to preclude
coverage for this previously manifested damage, 89 while at the
same time upholding the reasonable expectations of the insured by
allowing the first party insured to look to his present carrier for
coverage. 
90
In addition to meeting the expectations of the first party
insured, the manifestation theory in this context also makes the
underwriting practice of the insurance industry more predictable.
9
'
Because the insurer is not liable for a loss unless damage manifests
itself during the policy, the insurer cannot be liable after its
contract expires 92 nor can it be expected to remain a guarantor of
the insured's property indefinitely. As a result, the manifestation
theory allows insurers to gauge the amount of premiums needed to
cover potential risks with greater certainty, thereby avoiding
needless increases in reserves and presumably reducing costs to
insureds. 9
4
It must also be recognized that a vast majority of potential
insureds facing construction defect problems will be
unsophisticated homeowners under a standard homeowner's
policy. Hence, application of the manifestation theory for property
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 2002 WL
32121257, at *3 (E.D. La. 2002), rev'don other grounds, 363 F.3d 372 (5th Cir.
2004).
90. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246-47.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. C.E. Albert Constr. Co., 661 So. 2d 1093, 1096
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
94. Prudential, 798 P.2d at 1246.
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owners prevents these owners from bearing the burden of proving
when damages actually resulted instead of when they were
discovered.9
The adoption of the manifestation theory in the first party
context makes practical sense from both the standpoint of the
insured as well as the insurer. Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes
these advantages; however, Louisiana courts fall short in failing to
realize the advantages of separating the analysis for third party
policies.
C. Why the Manifestation Theory Does NOT Work for Third Party
Policies
In contrast to first party insurance coverage, third party policies
are concerned with establishing negligence on the part of the
insured or otherwise assessing tort liability. 96 The insurer assumes
a contractual duty to "pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay." 97 Thus, it is a damaged third party who
initiates the action against the insured.98 The insured's right to
coverage thereafter depends on whether the insured is at fault as
determined by a traditional tort analysis.99 This analysis is in stark
contrast to a causation analysis by reference to a covered peril as in
first party property insurance; consequently, the analysis of what
triggers coverage should also differ.
Typical policy language of a third party liability policy, such as
a CGL policy, does not provide support for the manifestation
theory. These policies typically state that such "insurance applies
to.. . 'property damage' only if... [the damage] is caused by an
'occurrence' . . . [and the property damage] occurs during the
policy period."' 00  "Property damage" is generally defined as
95. James Pest Control, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 485, 491 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2000).
96. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 886
(Cal. 1995) (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710
(Cal. 1989)).
97. Sample Policy, supra note 8, at 1111.
98. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 887.
99. Id. at 886 (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710).
100. Sample Policy, supra note 8, at 1111.
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"[p]hysical injury to tangible property [wherein] such loss of use
shall be deemed to occur at the time of physical injury that caused
it."'' "Occurrence" is then defined as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions."
10 2
When these clauses are read together, the policy clearly
distinguishes between the causative event and the resulting
property damage. 10 3  According to this language it is only the
damage that must occur during the policy period. 0 4 There is no
requirement, however, that this damage must become manifest
during the policy period. 1
05
In addition, because CGL policies only require the injury to
take place during the policy period, subsequent policy revisions
failed to definitively resolve the time the injury occurred,
particularly in long term injurious exposure situations.'0 6
Although the insurance industry knew of the potential for multiple
policies to be triggered in such situations, the drafters failed to
precisely define the time of injury and also refused to include
language incorporating either the exposure theory or the
manifestation theory. 10 7  Therefore, the insurance industry's
recognition that multiple policies could be implicated indicates an
implied rejection of the manifestation theory in the third party
liability context.
Furthermore, application of the manifestation theory for such
an occurrence-based liability policy would have the effect of
making such a policy operate more similar to a "claims made"
101. Id. at 1124.
102. Id.
103. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 890.
104. Id.
105. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Scheyd, Inc., 673 So. 2d 274, 278 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1996).
106. Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 916 (Haw.
1994) (citing Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp.
1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.
1984)).
107. Id. at 917.
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policy. 10 8 A claims made policy restricts coverage to the policy in
effect when a claim is actually asserted against the insured. 10 9
Hence, timing of the damage or injury is irrelevant." ° Such
policies limit the insurer's risk, thereby permitting the insurer to
more accurately establish reserves while at the same time lowering
the P remiums to the insured for the corresponding decrease in
risk. "
Reading a manifestation trigger into the policy would have the
same effect, by similarly limiting coverage to only that policy
period when damage was discovered, in the same manner as
limiting coverage to the period when a claim was made. Such a
transformation would therefore fail to give effect to the broader
and more expensive occurrence-based coverage." 2 The fact that
the insurance industry has introduced the option of claims made
policies in lieu of occurrence-based policies for comprehensive
general liability insurance for a corresponding lower premium
further demonstrates why such a transformation is unwarranted. 1
3
As noted earlier, application of the manifestation theory seems
to uphold the loss in progress rule. 14 However, even though this
rule is still applicable in the third party context, due to the differing
nature of liabilities, the loss in progress rule's application must
also differ in this context. 115 Because third party policies provide
coverage for the insured's liability, the loss in progress rule only
108. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 903-04. This assumes that that the property
owner would make the claim in the same policy period as the damage was
discovered, which may or may not happen.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. See also MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 180, at 482 ("The
most significant change [made in replacing the 1973 CGL policy with the 1986
policy] is that the policy was made available on either an 'occurrence' or a
'claims made' basis.").
114. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Super. Ct., 798 P.2d 1230, 1246-47
(Cal. 1990).
115. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 905-
06 (Cal. 1995). See also Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d
894, 919-20 (Haw. 1994).
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precludes the procurement of insurance for a known liability." 6
The absence of risk in such a situation would disallow the
insurability of a known liability in a like manner as if the insured
knew of property damage in the first party context. 
1 1 7
However, as long as there is uncertainty regarding the
"imposition of liability" and no "legal obligation to pay" has been
established, then an insurable risk exists in the third party liability
context.118 Thus, coverage is not precluded per the loss in progress
rule as long as the insured's liability has yet to be established prior
to entering into the contract of insurance with his carrier."
9
Consequently, the loss in progress rule does not mandate the use of
the manifestation theory for a third party liability policy since the
focus is again on liability rather than a covered peril.
D. Why the Injury-in-Fact Theory Works for Third Party Policies
The injury-in-fact theory provides that the policy in effect
when the damage actually occurred is responsible for coverage. 20
This trigger, consequently, does not require the damage to manifest
itself during the policy period. 12 1  However, the injury-in-fact
trigger does require proof, in retrospect, that the damage was
actually in existence during the applicable policy period.
22
By requiring a finding that the damage actually occurred
during the policy period, the injury-in-fact theory is the theory of
coverage that is most consistent with the language of a commercial
general liability policy.' 2 3 As demonstrated earlier, the language
116. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 905.
117. Id.
118. Id at 905-06.
119. Id. at 906.
120. Goodman, supra note 16, at 265. For other jurisdictions applying the
injury-in-fact theory, see Spartan Petroleum Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162
F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying South Carolina law); N. States Power Co. v.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y, 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994); Kief Farmers Coop.
Elevator v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28 (N.D. 1995); Ellis Ct.
Apartments Ltd. v. Woodside Corp., 72 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
121. Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 915 (Haw.
1994).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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of a CGL policy clearly distinguishes between the causative event
and the resulting property damage in its definition of "occurrence,"
wherein only the latter must occur during the policy period to
trigger coverage. 24 Therefore, the injury-in-fact theory and the
CGL policy language are consistent in that they are both concerned
only with when the damage actually occurred instead of applying a
theory that only provides a benchmark or best guess.
This common sense approach to determining when coverage is
triggered is further complimented by the realization that in certain
situations, the injury-in-fact theory subsumes both the
manifestation theory and exposure theory.' 25  For instance, if
damage actually occurs simultaneously with manifestation, as in
the case of cosmetic damage, then the manifestation theory and the
injury-in-fact theory are one and the same. 126 Likewise, if damage
occurs simultaneously with exposure to a certain condition, such as
in the case of asbestos inhalation or toxic torts, the exposure theory
and the injury-in-fact theory are also equivalent. 127  Therefore,
since the injury-in-fact theory is only concerned with the reality of
when damage actually occurred, it only differs from analysis under
the manifestation or exposure theories when the damage occurs
somewhere between the exposure to harm and the discovery of
resulting damage.' 2
8
One advantageous application of the manifestation theory is its
elimination of the difficult factual finding inherent in the injury-in-
fact theory. However, holders of CGL policies are likely to be
more sophisticated businesses rather than the typical homeowner
with a standard homeowner's policy. Regardless of whether it is
an individual or a sophisticated business entity that bears the
124. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 890
(Cal. 1995).
125. Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 917.
126. Id. (citing Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1541,
1550 (C.D. Cal. 1992)) (reasoning that because plaster pitting on the interior
walls is a type of cosmetic damage, the damage did not occur until the pitting
manifested itself), aft'd, 41 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1994).
127. Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 917 (citing TBG, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 806 F. Supp. 1444, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
128. Id. at 917.
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burden of proving when the actual damage occurred, such a fact-
intensive determination is not an impossible undertaking. 1
29
To begin with, as mentioned above, there may be situations
where the actual damage will be easily pinpointed because the
actual injury happens simultaneously with either exposure to the
harm or its manifestation.' However, even in situations where
the actual damage falls somewhere in between and is more difficult
to determine, it is presumable that with the aid of experts, finders
of fact will be able to determine when the damage occurred with
reasonable accuracy.' 3 1  Moreover, exactness is not required;
rather, "[a]ll that is necessary is reasonably reliable evidence that
the injury . . . more likely than not occurred during a period of
coverage."
32
As indicated earlier, because of the differing nature of liability
with a third party policy, application of the injury-in-fact theory is
not precluded by the loss in progress rule as long as the insured's
liability remains contingent and uncertain. 133 In addition, although
the injury-in-fact theory does not provide the same measure of
predictability for the insured as the manifestation theory, it must be
recognized that CGL policies were not written to optimize
predictability in setting reserves. 134  Such predictability was
instead sought to be achieved by the creation of the "claims made"
policy. 135
E. A Notable Exception to the Injury-in-Fact Theory's Application
-Progressive Damage
As demonstrated above, the injury-in-fact theory is the most
equitable in the third party context because it is concerned with the
129. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 673
A.2d 164, 169 (Del. 1996).
130. Id. at 170 (quoting Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565
F. Supp. 1485, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.
1984)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 905-
06 (Cal. 1995); Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 919-20.
134. Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 917.
135. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 903 n.24.
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reality of when the injury actually happened, consistent with policy
language. Under this theory, the policy in effect when the damage
occurred pays. However, what happens when the actual injury
occurs continuously over numerous policy periods, perhaps
implicating multiple insurers, as in the case with progressive
property damage? In such a case, the continuous injury theory
should be utilized in conjunction with the injury-in-fact theory.
The continuous injury theory provides that progressive
property damage is covered by all successive policies in effect
during the period of progressive damage. 136 Progressive property
damage refers to continuing damage, which occurs over an
extended period of time.1 37  Therefore, a pure injury-in-fact
analysis would find that the repeated activities of the insured
caused property damage during the term of multiple policies. In
such a case, the continuous injury trigger may be applied to
"equitably apportion liability among insurers" whose policies were
in effect at the time damage was actually occurring. 3 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Louisiana is neck deep in a massive rebuilding effort to prove
to the rest of the country and the world that New Orleans and other
affected areas of the Gulf Coast can rebound and resume business
and life. The amount of rebuilding and the speed with which it
must be accomplished will unfortunately result in another round of
cleanup in the form of construction claim litigation. It is essential
that Louisiana provide clear guidance on insurance coverage
triggers, which, heretofore, the jurisprudence has lacked.
The confusion surrounding the context in which a Louisiana
court should apply the manifestation theory versus the exposure
136. Goodman, supra note 16, at 267.
137. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 882 n.6.
138. Sentinel, 875 P.2d at 917. When the injury-in-fact occurs
simultaneously with the exposure for progressive property damage, the
continuous injury theory operates similar to the exposure theory as applied in
Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 201, 208 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2003). In that case, the court applied the exposure theory for environmental
property damage, triggering multiple policy periods between 1960 and 1986. Id.
Therefore, the court determined coverage would be allocated among the policies
applying a pro rata basis. Id.
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theory in property damage claims stems from the courts' failure to
draw a preliminary distinction between whether the claim is one
involving a homeowner against his homeowner's insurance policy
(a first party policy), or one involving a contractor looking to his
CGL carrier for potential liability resulting from his negligence (in
a third party liability context). Drawing such a distinction is
imperative due to the different nature of risks insured by these two
policies. First party policies are concerned with providing
coverage for the direct loss incurred by the insured, as opposed to
third party liability policies which are concerned with damage
caused to a third party due to the insured's tortious acts. Such a
difference in risk results in different policy language and different
expectations of the contracting parties, and demands a different
analysis to determine whether coverage has been triggered.
When a homeowner initiates a claim against his homeowner's
insurance carrier, coverage should be triggered when the
homeowner discovered or reasonably should have discovered the
damage. Application of the manifestation theory in this context
complies with the policy language of the standard homeowner's
policy and conforms with the expectation a typical homeowner has
in looking to the insurer to whom he is paying premiums to cover
such damage.
If, however, the homeowner believes such damage is caused by
a construction defect resulting from a contractor's negligence, then
the homeowner could bring an action directly against the
contractor. In such a case, the contractor's CGL carrier would be
looked to for coverage by the contractor in the event liability was
imposed upon him.139 On the other hand, the homeowner's first
party policy could pay the insured homeowner and thereafter be
subrogated 14 to the homeowner's right to file a negligence claim
against the contractor. In either case, because the CGL policy
should provide coverage against the contractor's liability, an
139. Although a commercial general liability policy includes several work
and product exclusions to damage to property, if the contractor purchased
completed operations coverage, then the "your work" exclusion does not apply
to work performed by subcontractors. See Sample Policy, supra note 8, at 1116
exclusion (j). Furthermore, such exclusion does not exclude damage caused to
other property due to this defect.
140. See MCKENZIE & JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 333, at 1011.
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injury-in-fact analysis should be applied to determine when
damage actually occurred, thus triggering coverage. In addition, if
the evidence is such that the damage actually occurred and
continued to occur, as in the case of water or mold damage, then
the continuous injury trigger should be utilized to allocate liability
among all third party liability insurers who provided coverage
during this period.
The result of such different analyses to the triggering of
coverage is to provide clear guidance to courts, as well as to give
the insured the most equitable recovery while imposing risk on
those who incurred the risk. The homeowner is not at fault and,
furthermore, has paid premiums to shift his risk to his carriers.
Therefore, the insured homeowner should be provided maximum
potential coverage by either requiring his first party policy insurer
to provide coverage or look to the negligent contractor's CGL
carrier. This allows the expense of repairs to fall on those who
have incurred the risk by pursuing profitable businesses in either
construction or insurance, rather than the victim of a defectively
constructed home.
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